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  • 第三方认证机构与生产企业证后监督博弈分析

    DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1674-5698.2024.09.006

    作者:冀晓东;李萍萍;孙高岭;陈振武;王锟桠

    关键词:证后监督;第三方认证机构;演化博弈

    Evolution Game Analysis of the Monitoring after Certification ofThird-party Certification Bodies and Production Enterprises

    Author:JI Xiaodong;LI Pingping;SUN Gaoling;CHEN Zhenwu;WANG Kunya

    Keywords:monitoring after certification;third-party certification bodies;evolutionary game

    摘要:

    第三方认证机构的证后监督是对政府监管力量的有效补充,但实际上,其对获证企业施行证后监督普遍存在乏力问题。本文以促进第三方认证机构履行证后监督责任为出发点,构建生产企业和第三方认证机构间的演化博弈模型,研究双方在博弈过程中的策略选择及影响因素。研究结果表明,对第三方认证机构而言,实施证后监督对生产企业造成的潜在损失和第三方认证机构支付的监督成本是影响证后监督机制发挥作用的关键因素,并且当市场处于非稳定状态时,仅依靠第三方认证机构的监督无法做到对市场的有效控制,需政府监管同步增强;对政府而言,增加对生产企业处罚比增加对第三方认证机构处罚更有利于博弈双方向生产合格产品、证后监督的帕累托策略演化。

    Abstract:

    The post-certification supervision of the third-party certification body is an effective supplement to the government’s regulation, but in fact, its post-certification supervision of certified enterprises is generally weak. This paper takes the promotion of the third-party certification body to fulfill the responsibility of post-certification supervision as the starting point, constructs the evolutionary game model between the production enterprise and the third-party certification body, and researches the strategic choices and influencing factors of both parties in the game process. The results of the study show that, for the third-party certification body, the implementation of post-certification supervision of the potential losses caused by the production enterprises and the third-party certification body to pay the cost of supervision is the key factor affecting the role of the post-certification supervision mechanism. And when the market is in a non-stable state, only relying on the supervision of the third-party certification body can not effectively control market, the government needs to enhance supervision. For the government, increasing penalties for manufacturers rather than for third-party certification bodies is more conducive to the evolution of the Pareto strategy of producing qualified products and post-certification supervision.

    基金项目:本文受国家社会科学基金重大项目“推动高质量发展的质量治理体系与政策研究”(项目编号:18ZDA079)资助。

    作者简介:冀晓东,中级职称,研究方向为标准认证与质量管理。李萍萍,硕士研究生,研究方向为质量管理。孙高岭,研究方向为标准认证与质量管理。陈振武,博士研究生,研究方向为供应链质量管理。王锟桠,通信作者,硕士研究生,研究方向为质量管理。

    主管单位:

    国家市场监督管理总局

    主办单位:

    中国标准化研究院

    中国标准化协会

    国内刊号:

    CN11-5811/T

    国际刊号:

    ISSN1674-5698

    创刊时间:

    1964年

    出版周期:

    月刊

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